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ALUMNI NOTES.
Thomas McCachran, of the class of 199,
has made several visits to the school during
the month.
H. D. Carey, '96, has now an office at
Scranton and Jermyn, and has an excellent practice. He paid 'a short visit to
Carlisle lasb week.
D. Edward Long, '99, is situated in very
comfortable quarters in Chambersburg,
and reports a flourishing practice.
Edwin S. Livingood, '98, has recently
been admitted as an attorney to the Berks
county bar.
ALLISON LITERARY SOCIETY.
The term now closing has been one of
serious work and marked improvement for
the Allison Literary Society. At no time
in the past, within the experience of its
present members, has there been such a
willingness to work, such preparation,
such harmony, and such good management of the affairs of the society by its
officers and executive committeelas during
the past term. One marked improvement,
deeply significant of the interest taken,
has been in the far larger average attendance. The society has been particularly

fortunate in securing a number of excellent men from theJuniorclass. A number
of them are already speakers of great force
and considerable experience, and those
to whom the art of speaking is a new
study are taking constant advantage of all
the opportunities afforded, and are fast
overcoming the defects of inexperience and
coming into command of their natural
powers. Among the recently elected members are Burchenal and Brock, tried men
and successful in the field of debate during
their course in Dickinson. Other men
elected are Bowers, Castenbader, Lord and
Hardesty. The society at its meeting on
November 24th, resolved to extend a challenge to the Dickinson Society foran intersociety debate. Committees were appointed
by both societies, and an agreement entered into. The debate is to be held early
in February. The subject is to be selected
by the speakers. There are to be three
speakers from each society, and in pursuance of the agreement that the speakers
are to be selected before December 8th, the
Allison Society elected Messrs. Prince,
Rothermel and Lentz as its representatives.
What is the matter with the football
team ?-and there is not even a thoughtless Junior to pipe a tone and quavering
"They're all right." From which, however, it would be quite Wrong to jump to
the conclusion that they are all wrong.

THE FORUM.
Physically, the team was the superior of a
number of teams by which it was beaten.
The secret of their defeat must therefore
lie either in their mental inferiority, or in
their lack of proper coaching. Take your
choice, ye gentlemen who control these
matters, and may Heaven speed you to a
good guess and us to a good team.
DICKINSON SOCIETY.
Since the last issue of the FORUm the
meetings have been growing in interest
and profitableness. Through the untiring
energy and enthusiastic zeal of Mr. Henderson, chairman of the executive committee, the programmes have reached a degree
of instructiveness and excellence unparalleled in the former programmes of this
society.
The first programme of the mouth consisted of a debate on the question, "Besolved, That the Boers are justified in
waging their present war against the
British in South Africa." Messrs. Buck
and Shellenberger ably discussed the
affirmative, and Messrs. Ryan and Sloan
the negative.
B
On November 24th, the question, " esolved, That the United States should annex the island of Cuba," was discussed,
affirmatively by Messrs. Davis and Osborne, and negatively by Messrs. Trude
and Rhodes. The society was greatly
pleased to notice these new members handle the subject so ably, and take so great
an interest in the work of the organization.
On the same evening Mr. Shellenberger
rendered an oration on "National Ideals"
with a grace and elegance which did no
small honor to the organization to which
he belongs.
The programme of December 1st, also
consisted partly in debate on the question,
".Resolved, That Porto Rico should be
given a territorial form of government."
The question was examined in its every
phase by the speakers, who were Messrs.
Shaffer and Moon, affirmative, and Messrs.
Trude and Rhodes, negative.
Mr. Frantz gave an exhaustive discussion on the subject, "Was the course taken
by Joseph Chamberlain, in regard to the
South African affair, a proper one ?" and
Mr. Bowers entertained the society with a
pleasing recitation.

By the direction of the executive committee, the President, Mr. Winlick, regularly calls on the members of the society
for impromptu talks on live subjects-a
practice which can meet with naught but
commendation.
Senator Weakley has been giving
monthly examinations to the Middlemen
---something which they all appreciate.
The proceedings of the Bar Association
have been added to the Law Library.
The Faculty have begun to give the
Juniors Moot Court cases.
Messrs. Smith, Mearkle and Trude have
been selected to represent the Dickinson
Society in the inter-society debate.
WEORCAN CLUB.
The Weorcan Club has about perfected
its organization, having adopted its constitution during the first meeting of the
past month. The members all seem to
take to the work with a vimi and much
good is expected by each individual. The
Club has already read Webster's Bunker
Hill Oration, and hopes after the holidays
to take up one of the plays of Shakespeare.
Incidentally, the members have had most
instructivc drill in parliamentary procedure.
DELTA CI FRATERNITY.
The following men of the Junior class
have been initiated as members of Delta
Chi: Lauer, Barr, Elder and Moon.
On Friday, December 8th, the fraternity
held a smoker in its rooms. There were a
number of alumni and honorary members present on the occasion.
Daniel F. Deal, '00, was married to Miss
M. G. Johnson during the past Summer.
The Junior class, on the last Monday of
the term, passed a resolution to ask the
Dean to add two dollars yearly to all term
bills, the money to be for the use of the
Athletic Association. The vote was almost unanimous. The matter will be considered by the Middler and Senior classes
after vacation, and every one who wishbs
to draw tighter the bonds of community
will hope for a favorable vote on the matter.
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The board which has in charge the publication of this year's Microcosm is exerting itself to the utmost to make the book
a grand success. This, of course, will require the hearty support of the students.
In view of the fact that the Law School
has two representatives on the board, and
is entitled to one-quarter of the space of
the entire book, it is earnestly desired that
the law men will be liberal in their subscriptions for the same.
Lauer, '02, was elected Vice-President
of the Dickinson Athletic Association.
Johnston,01, the second nomineefrom the
Law School, withdrew, leaving Lauer the
only candidate.
THE INTER-SOCIETY DEBATE.
Under the conditions prescribed by the
joint committee of the Allison and Dickinson Literary Societies, the debaters appointed met to decide upon a question for
debate. The topic upon which the question will finally be formulated is "Trusts."
THE W. D. BOYER PRIZES.
The balanced man has atlast been recognized. Time was when the heads of our
schools, their patrons and supporters, were
one in a common aim. To develop the
cerebral lobes, to cram with knowledge,
this was their lifds one endeavor. Ordinarily, the rickety, "over-engined" as
Kipling would say, weak framed, weak
kneed morally and physically, is the breed
that attains the most in scholarship.
Their youth is too weak to draw them
from their studies, they feel their lack of
that genial quality of manhood that leads
to ruin or success, and they plod with despairing persistence along the road of
books -and theses, too weak to think
for themselves, dumbly toiling along
under the call and urging of blind and forgetful elders that are ever crying, "This
is the way! This is the way to success !"
But the world sends back strange news to
the college: "Somehow, your repository
of the ages, your concentrated absorption
of book knowledge, seems to be s~ldom a
man of sympathy, action in affairs, or
magnetism," and to-day the rumor is
abroad among us that the best men in class
do not make the best men in the world.

Why? For the reason that they are not
balanced. They are specialists. And, for
a certainty, the man who would succeed
among men must be vastly more than a
two-legged encyclopedia of selected cases
and common law. The W. D. Boyer prizes.
to be given in the Law School, one condition being that the contestants shall be also
athletes, areatimely recognition of the fact
that, to attain sanity of mind and body,
there is required an expenditure of time
and energy which positively precludes the
parrot proficiency of the day and night
student. The athlete necessarily devotes
much of his time to athletics and the
large number of acquaintances they bring
him. Ishetobeencouraged? Thisi the
question which Mr. Boyer has answered,
and-sweet sign of the times, he has answered in the affirmative.

MOOT COURT.
VINCENT HARRISON vs. BOROUGH

OF CARLISLE.
Borough's responsibility for negligence of
police.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

On July 4, 1899, certain citizens of the
Borough of Carlisle determined to give an
exhibition of fireworks on the streets of
the borough. An ordinance provided that
this should not be done without the consent of the Burgess. This he declined to
give.
Notwithstanding, the exhibition
commenced at 7 o'clock with the knowledge of the burgess and the police. It
continued until 11. At that time a rocket
was recklessly discharged and hit the
horse of the plaintiff, causing him to run
off, and severely injure the plaintiff. He
therefore brings this suit against the borough for $5000 damages.
HARTMAN

and BucK for plaintiff.

1. The burgess was the agent of the
borough, and the borough is responsible
for injury resulting from his neglect of
duty.
Borough of Millerstown v. Bell,
et. al., 123 Pa. 151.
MILLER

and

LIGHTNER

for defendant.

1. Police, though appointed by a municipality, are not its agents, and municipalities cannot be held responsible for injuries resulting from malfeasance or nonfeasance by its police officers. Freeman v.
City of Phila., 7 W. N. 0. 45; McDade v:
Chester City, 117 Pa. 414; Borough of
Morristown v. Fitzpatrick, 94 Pa. 121.
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OPINION OF THE COURT.

We are unable to distinguish the case at
bar from thatofNorristownv. Fitzpatrick,
94 Pa. 121. There, the plaintiff was injured while crossing a public thoroughfare in the borough, by the discharge of a
small cannon fired by a body of citizens
who were at the time, to the number of
at least twenty-five, standing on the
An ordinance of the borough
street.
specially forbade the lighting or throwing
in the street of crackers or any article
made of gunpowder, and although the
firing of the cannon had been going on
for about two hours preceding the accident,
and although at the time of the accident
a police officer of the borough was present
and made no effort to prevent the firing
of the cannon, it was held that the municipality was not liable to the plaintiff for the
damage sustained by her. After showing
that for the neglect of a police officer the
borough cannot be held liable, the court
points out that the necessary result is that
the exemption from responsibility in such
cases is complete. There are undoubtedly
cases which lay down the general rule that
for failure to abate a nuisance in its highways a municipality is liable in damages
to persons suffering injury thereby. But,
admitting that the discharge of cannons
or fireworks in the street is a nuisance, it
is one that a municipality cannot abate by
the use of ordinary methods and appliances such as suffice for the removal of obstructions or the repair of dangerous
places. Resort must be had to the police
force, and, as has been said, for the neglect
of policemen the municipality is clearly
not responsible. Elliott v. The City, 25
P. F. Smith, 347; Norristown v. Fitzpatrick, supra; Trickett on Pa. Borough
Law, vol. 1, p. 271.
It is true that whereas in Norristown v.
Fitzpatrick the borough ordinance absolutely forbade the discharge of fireworks,
in the case at bar such discharge is made
unlawful only when done without a permit from the burgess. But the burgess
had expressly refused to issue a permit,
and the fact that he was aware of the
violation of the ordinance and took no
immediate steps to prevent its continuance
or to punish the offenders cannot be construed as a permit. At the most, it was a

iieglect of. his duty as an officer of the
borough, for which, as has been seen, the
municipality is notanswerablein damages.
The case of Norristown v. Fitzpatrick,
supra, upon which this decision is rested,
is in accord with the decided weight of
American authority. Judge Dillon, in his
great work on Municipal Corporations,
fourth Ed., p. 950, says: "Unless there be
a valid contract creating or a statute declaring the liability, a municipal corporation is not bound to secure a perfect execution of its by-laws relating to its public
powers, and it is not responsible civilly
for neglect of duty on the part of its
officers in respect to their enforcement,
although such neglect results in injury to
private persons which would otherwise
not have happened." See also Robinson
v. Greenville, 42 Ohio St. 630; Lafayette
v. Timberlake, 88 Ind. 330; Ball v. Woodbine, 61 Iowa 83; Bartlett v. Clarksburg,
W. Va. 43 L. R. A. 295.
Judgment for defendant.
GRAYSON vs. RAILROAD COMPANY.
Contributorynegligence.
STATEMIENT OF THE CASE.

On the evening of September1, 1899, the
plaintiff purchased a ticket at the office of
the defendant railroad at Carlisle, Pa., for
Harrisburg. Hegotupon the train at Carlisle. All of the seats upon the train were
occupied, and there were several standing
in the aisles of the cars. The aisles were
not crowded, however. The plaintiff,
thinking he would be more comfortable,
walked to the rear platform and sat there,
contrary to a regulation of the railroad
company, posted in each car. While
rounding a sharp curve at a high rate of
speed the plaintiff was thrown off and injured. He brings this action for $5,000
damages sustained.
LENTZ and FENTON for plaintiff.

1. A printed placard is not sufficient
notice to excuse a railroad company from
liability and charge a passenger with contrlbutory negligence. Notice of danger
must be proved. Laing v. Colder et at.,
8 Barr 482; Meier v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company, 64 Pa. 225 ; 6 P. F. Smith
294.
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BOLTE and MEYER for defendant.
1. The plaintiff's acts show contributory negligence, and the railroad company
is excused from liability for injury resulting therefrom. Deery v. Railroad, 163
Pa. 403; Lehigh Valley Railroad v. Greiner, 113 Pa. 600; Pennsylvania Railroad
v. Langdon, 62 Pa. 21 ; West Chester and
Philadelphia Railroad v. McElwee, 17 P.
F. S. 311 ; Railroad Company v. Jones, 95
U. S. 441; Camden and Atlantic R. R. v.
Hoosey, 99 Pa. 492.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The defendant unquestionably neglected
its duty to the plaintiff in failing to provide him with a seat. In Camden and
Atlantic Railroad Company v. Hoosey, 99
Pa. 492, Mr. Justice Sterrett, writing for
the court, said : "Without assenting to
the broad proposition contended for, that
a railroad company, using steam motive
power, is bound absolutely and under all
circumstances to provide every passenger
in the train with a seat, it cannot be'questioned that, as a general rule and under
ordinary circumstances, it is the duty of
such company to provide suitable car accommodations and seats for those whom it
undertakes to carry." Nothing appears
in the case before us to exempt the defendant from this general rule of duty.
It is contended that the plaintiff is also
chargeable with negligence contributing
to his injury. Is it negligence for a passenger on a railway train, running at a
high rate of speed, to sit on the platform
of one of the coaches when there is standing room within? If untrammeled by
precedent, our judgment would be that
such conduct is notper se negligent; that
the question, under the circumstances, is
one upon which reasonable men might
differ; and that it should properly be submitted to the jury for decision. It is a
matter of common knowledge that men
frequently do ride upon the platforms of
passenger cars, with the knowledge and
consent of the employes in charge of the
train. Moreover, it may reasonably be
said that the great advancement in the
construction of railroad cars and roadbeds
has within recent years materially diminished the danger of such a position. As
was pointed out in the New York case of
Willis v. L. I. Ry. Co., 34 N. Y. 669, when
by reason of breach of duty by the carrier,
the passenger is not furnished with a seat,

he should not be regarded as per se negligent because of a failure to select that position on the train which is least exposed
to danger. The same view is supported
by Werle v. L. I. Ry. Co., 98 N. Y. 650,
and Graham v. McNeill, 43 L. R. A. 300.
The Supreme Court of this State has applied this sensible rule to passengers on
street railways, Mr. Justice Mitchell saying in the recent case of Thane v. Traction
Co., 191 Pa. 249: " There, the traveller, if
he is to get on at all, must stand on the
platform with its rods, etc., to hold by, or
inside with a strap for that purpose. He
is presented with a choice of evils, and his
action must be judged by the jury." See
also Germantown Ry. Co. v. Walling, 97
Pa. 55. But with reference to passengers
on steam railroads, the Supreme Court has
reached a different conclusion. Camden
& Atlantic R. R. Co. v. Hoosey, 99 Pa.
492. In the case cited, the facts were similar to those in the case at bar, the only
difference being that whereas here the
plaintiff was sittingon the platf3rm, there
he was standingand holding on by an iron
rail fixed to the car. The court held that
in so doing he was guilty of such negligence as to preclude him from recovering,
and that the court below should have so
instructed the jury. In view of such direct
authority, it is our duty to hold in this
case that the plaintiff is guilty of negligence per se, and to reverse the judgment
in his favor.
Judgment reversed.
CARLISLE

DEPOSIT

BANK vs.

SAMUEL D. MOWERY.
Conditional sale--Negotiable instruments
-Failure of consideration.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

On September 1, 1898, the defendant
purchased from the Carlisle Stove Co. a
furnace for $500. He gave to the Stove Co.
a note, as follows: "$500. Carlisle, Pa.,
September 1, 1899. For value received I
promise to pay sixty days after date to the
order of the Carlisle Stove Co. the sum of
five hundred dollars, with interest at the
rate of six per cent. The consideration
of this note is a furnace described in a contract of even date, which the undersigned.
has received from the Carlisle Stove Co.
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Nevertheless it is understood and agreed
that the title in the above-mentioned
property does not pass to the undersigned,
and that, until this note is paid, the title
to the furnace shall remain in the Carlisle
Stove Co., who shall have the right in
case of non-payment of the same, without
process of law, to enter and retain immediate possession of the said property, and
remove the same. Payable at the Farmers' Bank, Carlisle, Pa. Signed. Samuel
D. Mowery."
This note was sold to the Carlisle Deposit Bank, and duly endorsed by the
Carlisle Stove Co. The note is due, and
the defendant declines to pay the same on
the ground of failure of consideration.
This suit is therefore brought by the
holder.
CLARK and TAYLOR for -plaintiff.

The note is negotiable. Kimball Co. v.
Mellon, 80 Wis. 133. Vendee possesses
conditional property in the article, which
forms a consideration for the note. Day
v. Bossett, 102 Mass. 45; Chase v. Ingalls,
122 Mass. 381.
VALENTiNE and SmITH for defendant.

The note is non-negotiable. Com. v.
Howard, 149 Pa. 302 ; Mutchler v. Easton,
148 Pa. 441. There is an absolute failure
ofconsideration. Bank v. Wood, 142 Mass.
563 ; Bank ir. Anderson, 14 C. C. R. (Pa.)
513. Bank is boind by the notice of the
conditional sale.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
The note on which the plaintiff's action
is founded is an absolute and unconditional
promise to pay five hundred dollars, with
interest, sixty days from date. The note
is a negotiable one.
The stipulation that the title to the furnace should remain in the Carlisle Stove
Co. until the note given for the price of it
was paid, does nQt render the note non-negotiable. The sale was absolute. The
provision attached to the note was in effect
that the article purchased by the maker of
the note should be held by the vendor as
collateral for its payment.
In Kimball v. 'ellon, 80 Wis. 133, Chicago Railway Equipment Company v.
Merchants' Bank, 136 U. S. 268, and numerous other adjudicated cases, notes of
like character have been held to be negotiable.
In case of Bank v. Davis, 6 Mont. Co.
Rep. 97, cited by defendant, th3 Court de-

I ., ±' U .LVI.

clared it to be its opinion that the note
sued in that case "was negotiable," but
permitted an amendment substituting the
payee as legal plaintiff, because it was requested by the latter.
The note therefore in the case under
consideration being negotiable, the plaintiff would have been entitled to recover,
if he had acquired title to it before maturity.
But this does not appear by the pleadings. If sold by the payee to the plaintiff,
after maturity, it was taken subject to all
equities.
The defendant alleges that there was a
failure of consideration for the note. The
question before us is, Can this be set up by
him in the present action ? Under the
pleadings, we think he can do so, and
therefore judgment cannot be entered for
plaintiffs, but defendant must have an opportunity to 'show what defense he has, if
any, to the note. The motion for judgment is refused.
ESTATE OF HARRY WILLIAMS.
Orphans' court saleof realty-Substitution
of purchasers-Practice.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Harry Williams died on the first day of
September, 1899. Upon the petitionof the
administrator the court granted an order
for the sale of the deceased's farm for the
payment of debts. At the sale the property was struck down to Timon Hinson
for the sum of $5,000, and the ten per cent.
required by the conditions of salewasduly
paid.
Within ten days the purchaser entered
into a contract with Abram Norris, agreeing that the property purchased should be
confirmed to him upon the payment to
Hinson of $1,000 advance in price.
The administrator now asks to have the
sale confirmed to Abram Norris. Exceptions to the confirmation are now filed by
Nathan Lane, the residuary legatee.
HARPELL and GERY for the plaintiff.
1. An orphans' court sale will not be
set aside on account of the insufficient
price at which the property was sold. Pollard v. McFillen, 6 Phila. 125; Brown's
Appeal, 68 Pa. 53; Hazlett's Estate, 137
Pa. 587 ; Allen's Estate, 1 W. N. C. 317.
MuRR and AUBREY for the defendant.
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1. An orphans' court sale will be set
aside when it can be shown that an advance of at least ten per cent. will be realized by a second sale. Murphy's Estate,
I1 W. N. C.419; Demmy's Appeal, 43 Pa.
155 ; Haslage's Appeal 37 Pa. 440 ; Hamilton's Estate, 1 P. F.
58.
6.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

Courts of chancery do admit, tinder certain circumstances, in case of sales of real
estate, the substitution of another person
tbr the purchaser. Indeed, "it has been
declared to be the constant practice to permit the purchaser at a master's sale to
assign his bid and to direct the conveyance
to his assignee." Proctor v. Farnham, 5
Paige, 619.
The aim of the courts is, however, to
benefit the estate by procuring the largest
price which can possibly be realized. A
sale will not be confirmed where it appears
that there has been collusion between bidders, by reason of which the price was depressed. A very general practice prevails
under which the biddings will be opened
to allow another person to offer a larger
price than the land was originally sold for,
upon a bond being given to make good the
offer if a resale be ordered. And "the
rule in chancery seems to be that if a purchaser wants another person substituted
in his stead, the court will only do so, if
an advance is to be paid by the latter, upon
the payment of the additional price into
court for the benefit of theestate." Daniels' Pl. & Pr. in Chancery, Vol. 2, p. 1285.
To do otherwise would be against public
policy.
In Pennsylvania, the orphans' court in
Its jurisdiction over trustees is a court of
equity, and adopts the rules and principles of equity. Bayley's Appeal, 60 Pa.
.354.
Although no bond has been filed by the
exceptant in this case to ensure an advance over the bid made by Hinson, yet it
appears to the court that Norris is to pay
$6,000 for the property. This being the
case, the sale ought not to be confirmed
unless the advance is paid to the administrator.
The exception of Nathan Lane, who is
interested in the estate, will therefore be
sustained, unless provision is made to pay
the additional one thousand dollars into
the estate of the decedent.

McCORMICK vs. JOHNSTON.

Wido,o's exemption -Execution sale--Motion to stay execution.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

On the 30th day of June, 1899, McCormick entered a judgment exemption note
in the Court of Common Pleas of Centre
county to No. 147 August Term, 1899, in
the sum of $500, and issued execution on
the same day. Orders were given the
sheriff not to make a levy until further orders. Later there was an alias
issued. No levy was made upon that until after the death of Johnston, which occurred on September 27, 1899. Letters
testamentary were granted on the estate
of Johnston to Smith on October 2, 1899.
On the 3d of October the sheriff made a
levy on all the personal property of the
defendant. The administrator, etc., more
particularly the widow of Johnston, entered a rule to show cause why the execution should not be stayed until she received her $300 exemption under the Act
of J851. Rule granted. There is but $350
of personal property on the premises.
LIGHT and MCDoNALD for the plaintiff.
1. Where an execution is issued, and
levy not made, such execution is valid
upon all property of judgment creditor
until the return day of writ. Duncan v.
McCumber, 10 Watts 212; Bradin's Est.,
Wood's Appeal, 165 Pa. 184.
2. Widow has waived hdr right to exemption. Boyer's Appeal, 21 Pa., 210;
Huffman's Appeal, 81 Pa. 329.
RYAN and RILEY for the defendant.
1. Under statute of April 14,1851, widow
is entitled to exemption in preference to
judgment creditors, and under act of June
4, 1883, in preference to all creditors.
Weir's Estate, 10 C. C. Rep. 190; McMullin's Estate, 11 W. N. C. 562; Notte's Appeal, 45 Pa. 361.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
This is a rule to show cause why the execution of McCormick should notbe stayed.
The alias fi. fa. issued before Johuston's
death, and became at once a lien upon his
goods, although the levy was not made
until subsequently. Of this lien the death
did not deprive IcCormick, and the administrator should not be permitted to
stay the writ. unless cause is shown. The
only cause alleged, is the demand of the
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widow to have set apart to her $300 worth
of the goods.
The 5, Act April 14, 1851, 1 P. & L.
1525, gives to the widow the right to " retain either real or personal property belonging to said estate, to the value of $300."
This right does not prevail against a claim
for the purchase money of real estate, nor
against mortgages. Peebles' Estate, 157
Pa. 605 ; Graves' Estate, 134 Pa. 377. As
against mechanics' liens, Hildebrand's
Appeal, 39 Pa. 133; Towanda Bank's Appeal, 1 Mon. 463, and judgments, Kauffman's Appeal, 112 Pa. 645; Catherson's
Appeal, 100 Pa. 9; the claim is valid as
respects land. As respects chattels, It is
valid, despite the pending of the lien of a
ft. fa. at the decedent's death. Meier's
Estate, 6 Kulp. 102; McMullin's Estate,
11 W. N. C. 562; Cf. Barrett v. Barrett, 9 C.
C. 454, contr&.
The right to the exemption may be lost.
by delay in asserting it, when costs are incurred meantime by the creditor, or administrator. Was it lost in this case?
Johnston died September 27, 1899. Letters
testamentary were issued on October 2nd,
but five days afterwards. The sheriff made
the levy on October 3d. It is clear, then,
that no improper delay on the widow's
part induced the creditor to incur costs of
any kind. The letters were granted but
five days after Johnston's death, and it
was not obligatory on the widow to make
claim of the exemption on the same or the
following day. She was entitled to a
reasonable time, and this time she has not
exceeded.
The sheriff will sell the chattels unless
theft. fa. be stayed. This he should not
do. Such of them as the widow may select would, ipso facto, cease to be vendible
for the execution debt. It is proper, therefore, that the sale should be postponed,
until the widow secures an appraisement,
and the sheriff should therefore relinquish
his levy upon the goods selected by her.
Rule absolute.
ESSNER'S ESTATE.
Will-Deed-Powerof appointment.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Gustavus Essner died in 1883, leaving
one child, Peter. By will Essner left
$10,000 to his brother, Job, for life, with a

power of appointment by will. In 1880
Job executed and delivered to Conrad
Wagner, in the presence of two subscribing witnesses, an instrument, in form of
deed of indenture, which was acknowledged and recorded, purporting to convey
to Wagner all the property, real and personal, of which the said Job should be
seized and possessed at the time of his
death. Job died in 1885, and Wagner
claimed the $10,000 as appointee of Job,
while Peter Essner claimed the fund as
residuary legatee of Gustavus.
The Orphans' Court awarded the sum to
Essner, whereupon Wagner took this appeal.
O'KEEFFE and MITCHELL for the plaintiff.
1. The form of the instrument isimmaterial if its substance is testamentary.
Browne Dec. Est. 1455; Wilson v. Van
Leer, 103 Pa. 601; Rose v. Quick, 30 Pa.
225 * Frew et al. v. Clark. 80 Pa. 170.
2. A disposition of property held under
a power is, without reference to it, an exercise of the power when it appears that it
was so intended. Am. & Eng. Encyc. L.,
2nd Ed., Vol. 2, page 476; White et al. v.
Hicks, 33 N. Y. 383; Huton v.. Benkard,
92 N. Y. 295 ; Blake v. Hawkins, 98 U. S.
315.
MEAP.KLE and RUSSELL for defendant.
1. The instrument which executes the
power of appointment must show that the
donee had in mind, and intended to execute, the power. 4 Kent Comm. 335; Coryell v. Dunton, 7 Pa. 530 ; Jones v. Wood,
16 Pa. 25 ; Keefer v. Schwartz, 47 Pa. 503;
Drusadow v. Wilde, 63 Pa. 170; In. rePhiladelphia Trust Co., 13 Phila. 44; Bas.
sett v. Hawk, 114 Pa. 502.
2. The power was given in 1883, and the
document under which plaintiff claims
was made in1880. There was no intention
to execute the power. Estate of Eliza
Vaux, 11 Phila. 57; Estate of Horace
,2 W. N. C. 662 ; Thompson v. Garwood, 3 Whart. 287 ; Wetherill v. Wetherill, 18 Pa. 265; Dunnv. Biddle's Appeal,
85 Pa. 94.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

Ten thousand dollars were in 1883 bequeathed by Gustavus Essner to Job Essner for life, and, after his death, to such
person as Job should by will appoint. The
residue of his estate was bequeathed to
Peter Essner. Job Essner, in 1880, three
years before the bequest went into operation, had executed a deed.to Conrad Wagner for all the property, real or personal,
of which Job should be possessed at his
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death. Job dyingin 1885, not having made
other will than the deed of 1880, Peter
Essner claims the SI0,000, as residuary
legatee. Wagner claims it, as appointee
of Job under the power.
The only appointment alleged to have
been made was the deed of 1880. The
power was to appoint by will. An appointment otherwise would be void. Was
then the deed of 1880 a will? Instruments
in the form of a deed may be decreed wills,
e. g., Turner v. Scott, 51 Pa. 126. The
essence of a will, however, is, that it should
create no rights or obligations, impose no
restraints or power over property, prior to
the death o? the maker. If it creates such
restraints, such right or obligations, it operates before death. The possession and
enjoyment of the property may, under the
deed, pass to the grantee only at the
grantor's death, but that would not show
that it was testamentary. If thedeed confers on the grantee a present right to the
possession at death, it is not a will. 1 Jarman, Wills, *17; 29 Am. & Eng. Encyc.
140. The deed of 1880 was executed and
delivered to Wagner, was acknowledged
and recorded. It purported to convey to
Wagner whatever land or personalty Job
Essner should have at his death. It imposed then a restraint on Essner. Although
he retained the power to sell or give away
any property he had, so that he might
have denuded himself entirely of estate
before death, he lost the power to have
property at death, and to direct it, by deed
or will, to pass to any other than Wagner.
The deed, so far as wecan discover, unlike
that in Turner v. Scott, was to operate,
and did operate, before death. It altogether destroyed the testamentary power
of Essner, by withdrawing all property
from the operation of any later will.
But, were the deed of 1880 a will, would
it be a valid exercise of the power conferred
by Gustavus Essner's will? A power of
appointment cannot be executed unwittingly or without intention. An alleged
appointment must appear to have been
made with the intention to appoint. This
intention may be manifested by a recital
of the power and an express reference to
it. It may be manifested by the identity
of the subject of the disposition with that
of the power. Bingham's Appeal, 64 Pa.
845. It is impossible to discover any refer-

ence to the power, or purpose to execute
it, in the deed of 1880. The subject on
which it operates is not specifically differentiated. The power was to appoint a
taker of the $10,000 ; the deed is of all the
property, real and personal, of which the
grantor should die seized. The deed was
made in 1880, the power was conferred
in 1883. It is not supposable that the former was intended, when made, to be an
execution of the latter, not yet in existence. Dunn's Appeal, 85 Pa. 94; Fry's
Estate, 2 W. N. 662; Murray's Estate, 5
W. N. 296; Vaux's Estate, 11 Phila. 57.
Such would be the conclusion at common
law.
The 3, Act of June 4, 1879, 1 P. & L.
1446, directs that " a bequest of the personal estate of the testator, or any bequest
of personal property described in a general
manner, shall be construed to include any
personal estate, or any personal estate to
which such description shall extend, as
the case maybe, which he may have power
to appoint in any manner he may think
proper, and shall operate as an execution
of such power, unless a contrary intention
shall appear by the will." Under this
clause, the bequest of all the personalty of
which Job Essuqr should die possessed
would include that over which he had
when he made his deed, if to be considered
a will, the power of appointment. Ashburners' Trust Estate, 13 C. C. 559.
But the deed could but, when made, be
deemed the exercise of a power not in existence. Did the failure to revoke it (as a
will) amount to a readoption or republication of it, after the power had been acquired? The 1, Act June 4, 1879, 1 P. &
L. 1445, ordains that "every will shall
be construed with reference to the real and
personal estate comprised in it, to speak
and take effect as if it had been executed
immediately before the death of the testator, unless a contrary intention shall appear by the will." This iscopiedfrom the
English Act of 1 Vict. C. 26, which the
English courts have so interpreted as to
make a will executed before a power was
conferred to carry the property embraced
within the power. 2 Pingrey R. P. 1154.
We think that it is a natural and reasonable interpretation. It follows that were
the deed of 1880 to be deemed a will, it
would have effectively appointed Conrad
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Wagner to take the $10,000 in remainder.
As, however, the deed cannot be regarded
as a will, the Orphans' Court pr6perly
awarded the money to Peter Essner, as
residuary legatee.
Judgment affirmed.
HARRISON EBERLY vs. VINCENT
BRAILEY.
_ent-Parolevidence-Assumpsit.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

On October 1, 1896, the plaintiffleased to
the defendant a portion of a house, situated in the borough of Carlisle, for the
sum of $200 per month. Soon after water
flowed from the upper story, which was
occupied by the lessor, into the apartments
of the defendant, causing injury to his
goods to a large amount. This the lessor
refused to remedy after proper notice from
the lessee.
At the time of entering into the lease
the lessee claims that the lessor orally
agreed that the house would be kept in a
good and tenantable condition.
The lessor, the plaintiff, has brought
this action to recover the rent agreed upon
i
in the written lease.
HENDERSON and COBLENzZ for the
plaintiff.
1. In an action for rent it is no defense
that premises were in untenantable condition where there is no express provision in
lease that lessor should repair. Reeves v.
McComisky, 168 Pa. 571 ; Wheelerv. Crawford, 86 Pa. 327.
2. General rule of law is that parol evidence is inadmissible to vary or contradict
a written instrument. Russell v. Glass
Works, 6 Sup. C. Rep. 118; Thorne v.
Warfim, 100 Pa. 519; Jessop v. Ivory, 158
Pa. 71.
H1. M. COLLINS for the defense.
1. Parol evidence is admissible to vary
or even contradict a written instrument,
if made at time of entering into contract,
and parol stipulation is cause for so entering. Bollinger v. Eckert, 16 S. & R. 424;
Schweyer v. Walbert, 190 Pa. 335 ; Star v.
Means, Vol. 3 Forum 83.
2. Tenant is entitled to have damages
deducted from rent due; if in excess of
rent, then verdict for excess. Prescot v.
Otterstatler, 85 Pa. 334.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

It is not shown that the condition of the
building was such that the tenant was

compelled to move out. The question of
constructive eviction, therefore, does not
arise. See Am. & Eng. Encyc. of Law,
(2nd ed.) Vol. 11, p. 459, and cases there
cited.
The conduct of the plaintiff in refusing
to repair was not a violation of any covenant in the written lease. But the defendant contends, and offers to show, that
at the time of the execution of the lease
the plaintiff orally promised to keep the
premises in good and tenantable condition.
Is such an oral stipulation admissible in
evidence? We believe that it is. The general rule, to the effect that the terms of a
written instrument shall noebe modified
by parol evidence, has been seriously impaired in this State, and it is now held
that a parol stipulation may be admitted
in evidence, not only in case of omission
from the written instrument by reason of
mistake, accident or fraud, but also in ease
the parol stipulation was an inducement
to the execution of the written contract.
Walker v. France, 112 Pa. 203; Thomas v.
Loose, 114 Pa. 35; Ferguson v. Rafferty,
128 Pa. 337; Star v. Means, 3 Forum 83.
Proof of an oral agreement to repair by
the landlord would not, of course, entirely
defeat his action for rent. A covenant to
repair does not go to the essence of the
lease, so as to defeat the rent in toto ; and
the defendant would not be entitled to a
verdict unless it should appear that the
damages sustained by him were equal to
or in excess of the amount of rent due.
Prescott v. Otterstatler 85 Pa. 534 ; Obermeyer v. Nichols, 6 Binn. 159.
Our conclusion therefore is, not that
plaintiff should have been non-suited below, but that the court should have admitted the testimony of the defendant as
to the parol promise of the plaintiff to keep
the house in good and tenantable condition, with instructions to the jury that
they should have no regard for the testimony unless convinced that the defendant
was induced by such oral promise to execute the written lease. Thomas v. Loose,
supra, and Ferguson v. Rafferty, supra.
Judgment for plaintiff reversed, aaid venirefacia8de novo awarded.

THE FORUM.
MARY SMITH vs. ANNIE JONES.
Alienation of husband's affections-Trespass.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

On October 1, 1890, Mary Smith was
lawfully joined in wedlock to Vin. Smith.
In 1894 the defendant, Annie Jones, met
the said Win. Smith, and by various inducements alienated his affections from
his wife, the plaintiffin the present action.
Soon after Smith went to live with defendant. The plaintiff thereupon brought
an action for divorce on the ground of
adultery, and the same was awarded her
January 1, 1896. She now brings this action against Annie Jones to recover $10,000
for the alienation of her husband's affections.
KERN and LAVENS for theplaintiff.
1. A person may render himself liable
by inducing woman to leave huiband.
Modirett v. lcPicke. 74 Mo. 634.
2. Weight of authority indicates that
wife may maintain this action. Bennett
v. Bennett, 116 N. Y. 584 ; Gilchrist v.
Bale, 8 Watts 355.
L. FLOYD HEss for the defendant.
1. At common law alienation of husband's affections was not a tort, and consequently not actionable. Duffies v. Duffies, 76 Wis. 375; Lynch v. Knight, 9 H.
L. R. 577.
2. Neither statutes of June 11, 1879, referring to personal injuries, nor the mere
fact of divorce created a right of action or
made this a tort; hence right of action
does not now exist. Am. & Eng. Encyc.
of Law, 2nd Ed., Vol. 9, p. 854; B. P.
Digest, p. 1302, par. 41.
3. No damages may be recovered, since
by divorce she set her own value as nothing upon his affections, and no special
damage is alleged.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

There is some doubt whether or not at
the common law a woman had a right of
action for alienation of her husband's affection. Blackstone says: "The inferior
hath no kind of property in the company,
care or assistance of the superior, as the
superior is held to have in those of the inferior, and therefore the inferior can suffer
no loss or injury." 3 Comm. 142. See
also Duffies v. Duffies, 76 Wis. 374; 8 L.
R. A. 420. On the other hand, in Lynch
v. Knight, 9 H. L. Cas. 577, which passed
off on another point, the Lord Chancellor

expressed the opinion that such an action
might be maintained. The absence of direct common law precedent is not surprising, because at the common law it was
necessarv for the husband to join the wife
in bringing the action, and by so doing in
a case of this nature, he would be confessing that he had wronged his wife.
Looking to the gist of the action, there
appears to be no sound reason for denying
to the wife the right enjoyed by the husband. Marriage confers upon them mutual rights. Each is entitled in an equal
degree to the affection, society and com-,
panionship of the other. The wife, as well
as thehusband, needs the aid of the law in
the protection of their conjugal rights, and
the value to her of his society is as capable
of admeasurement in damages as is the
value to him of her society. Therefore,
when the wife has been freed from her
common law disability, and may sue in
tort in her own name, no reason remains
for denying her the right to maintain such
an action.
The right has been recognized in this
State, in Gernerd v. Gernerd, 185 Pa. 233,
where a large number of authorities are
collected. In addition to the cases there
cited, see Beach v. Brown (Wash.), 43 L.
R. A. 114, and foot-note thereto.
It is contended in the case at bar, however, that even though the plaintiff originally had the right to maintain such an
action, the right was lost when she obtained a decree of divorce. We cannot
take that view of the case. The decree of
divorce was an adjudication of rights between husband and wife, and not betwveen
wife and third parties. The fact of divorce
subsequent to the alienation of the husband's affection might affect the measure
of damages, but it would be very harsh and
unjust entirely to deprive the wife cf her
right of action, simply because the wron&ful acts of which she complains are so
grave as to create the necessity for a divorce.
The motion for a non-suit is therefore
denied.
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GRISWOLD vs. DODDS.
Contract,non-compliancewith- WaiverDamages.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Isaac Dodds agreed to drill two wells for
Mr. Griswold in the following manner, to
wit: "Said wells shall be drilled at the
location indicated by said Griswold," and
"shall be round holes, eight inches in diameter respectively, and are hereby guaranteed to be clear of all obstructions so
that a casing, six inches in diameter (inside measure), (outside would not exceed
seven inches at any point,) may be easily
lowered to the bottom of each," for which
Griswold agreed to pay seventy cents per
foot when wells were completed and casing
put in.
Dodds drilled well No. 1 with a six-inch
bit, but the hole was too small to admit
the casing. He then endeavored to make
the hole the required size by the use of an
eight-inch bit. The casing could not yet
be lowered in the customary manner, but
was forced down with the weight of the
tools, in the presence of Griswold, who
raised the question of injury to the casing
or sufficiency of the well. Dodds then
drilled well No. 2 with the eight-inch bit
successfully. Griswold, although aware
that well No. 1 was not what it ought to
have been, paid the contract price.
The wells were to be used for pumps at
a coal mine, the casing being a part of the
pump, with valves on lower end. It so
happened that the valve in pump No. I
(which was driven) was defective, and
made it necessary to take out the casing,
which was impossible by ordinary means
or by the use of jacks. Griswold notified
Dodds that the well was not a round hole,
eight inches in diameter, and requested
him to make it that as per contract. After
a reasonable time Griswold accomplished
the work at an expense of $171, having
removed the rock by an entrance from the
mine, and can prove that the well was a
crooked flat hole, less than seven inches
the narrow way, for a distance of about
five feet, and that this condition caused
the trouble, whereas well No. 2, which was
eight-inch round hole, was sufficient. Had
the location of wells been changed it would
have necessitated changing the location of

machinery and entrance of mine, which
could have been made only at a cost greater
than cost of completing the well, in the
manner in which Griswold performed the
work at a cost of $171.
STAUFFER and Miss MARVEL. for the

plaintiff.
Acceptance of the work did not imply a
waiver of strict performance. Smith v.
Brady, 17 N. Y. 173; Gilson v. Biugham,
43 Vt. 410; Chambers v. Crawford, Add.
150 ; City Iron Works v. Barber, 102 Pa.
156. Damages may be recovered to complete the work in exact accordance with
the contract. Wade v. Haycock, 25 Pa.
382; Dixons Woods Co. v. Philip Glass
Co., 169 Pa. 167; Trowbridge v. Barrett,
30 Wis. 661.
WALLACE and YEAGER for the defendant.
Plaintiff, by acceptance and payment,
waived his rights under the contract.
Shaw v. The Turnpike, 3 Pa. 445; Preston
v. Quincy, 2 W. & S, 55 ; Gery v. Del. Ry.
Co., 48 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 120; Quigley v.
DeHass, 82 Pa. 267.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

There was not a substantial compliance
by the defendant with the terms of the
contract. On the other hand he willfully
departed from its terms, and did not drill
the well of the diameter agreed upon. It
was put down upon the land of the plaintiff. It was not a chattel purchased by
the latter from the defendant, and which
had been accepted by him with a knowledge of its defects. He did not therefore
waive anything in the contract by accepting part performance. Smith v. Brady,
17 N. Y. 173; Gi son v. Bingham, 43 Vt.
410 ; Chambers v. Crawford Add. 150.
It is not pretended that there was any
consideration for the alleged waiver on the
part of the plaintiff. The measure ofdamageq to which the plaintiff is entitled is
what it cost him to have the well altered
so as to conform to the contract, or put in
a condition to serve the purposes for which
it was designed. Wade v. Haycock, 25
Pa. 382; City Iron Works v. Barber, 102
Pa. 157 ; Holmes v. Oil Co., 138 Pa. 546;
Chambers v. Crawford Add., 150.
The plaintiff is therefore entitled, under
the facts of the case, to the sum of $171 from
the defendant, and judgment is entered
accordingly.
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ELIZABETH WELSH vs. PENNA.
R. R. CO.
Damages-Alien'ssidt.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Plaintiff's husband, a subject of Wales,
an alien, residing in the State of Pennsylvania, was killed in an.accident within
said State while a passenger riding on a
train of cars of a corporation chartered by
said State. It is admitted that his death
was due to the negligence of the defendant
corporation. The deceased had never taken
out papers declaratory of becoming a citizen of this State, nor renouncing his allegiance to his own country.
Plaintiff, the widow of said deceased,
brought suit in Pennsylvania to recover
damages for his death. At the time of
said accident, and of the bringing of her
said action, plaintiff was, and still is, a
resident citizen of Wales. She has never
been in America.
Query-Hasthis plaintiff a right of action in Pennsylvania to recover damages
for the death of her said husband under
the provisions of our Acts of April 15, 1851,
and April 26, 1855 ?
HOLCOM and SHAFFER for the plaintiff
1. An alien may sue and be sued in the
proper courts to the same extent as a citizen, and is also entitled to appear by attorney for the purpose of claiming and
Am. & Eng. Encyc.
defending his rights.
(2nd ed.), Vol. 2 ,p. 66 ; United States Constitution, Art. IIL, Sec. 2; Hodgson &
Thompson v. Bowerbank, 5 Cranch U. S.
303 ; Com. v. Detmiller, 131 Pa. St. 638.
2. A right of action in case of the death
of the husband accrues to the widow by
the Acts of April 15, 1851, and April 26,
1855. Fink v. Garman, 40 Pa. 103 ; Birch
et al., Exs. v. Railway, 165 Pa. 339.
DOUGHERTY and SHELLENBERGER for

the defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

Had Elizabeth Welsh been a resident of
Pennsylvania when the death of her husband resulted from the negligence of the
company defendant, it would be conceded
that she had a right to recover damages
under the Acts of Assembly, approved
15th April, 1851, and 26th April, 1855.
Fisk v. Garman, 40 Pa. 103; R. R. v.
Decker, 84 Pa. 419; Birch v. R. R., 165
Pa. 339.
But it is contended that as she is a non-

resident alien, the court will not entertain
an action instituted by her.
The second section of the 3d Article of
the Constitution of the United States provides, "That judicial power shall extend
to all controversies between a State, or the
citizens thereof, and foreign States, citizens or subjects," while the powers vested
in the judiciary under the 5th Article of
the Constitution of Pennsylvania is not
limited as to the persons whose contentions shall be the subject of adjudication
before its judiciary.
In the Federal courts the right of aliens
to maintain actions has been frequently
recognized and determined. Hodgson &
Thompson v. Bowerbank et al., 5 Cranch
303 ; Hughes v. Edwards, 9 Wheaton 489.
A British subject may even sue the
United States in a Court of Claims. U.
S. v. O'Keefe, 11 Wallace 178.
It is the relation which the plaintiff bore
to the deceased which, under the laws,
entitled her to recover; and the tribunals
of this State may not inquire as to the nationality of the widowed litigant.
While the question presented in this
case has, we understand, been actually
raised in one of the courts of the Commonwealth, it is utterly untenable.
We are therefore of the opinion that the
plaintiff is entitled to recover the pecuniary damage from the defendant which
she has actually suffered by reason of the
death of her husband.
By the Court.
JOHNSON vs. ROMBERGER.
Certiorari-Justicesof the peace-Opening of judgment.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Edward Johnson, in right of his son,
George Johnson, sued C. M. Romberger
for wages, amounting to $5.22, before a
justice of the peace. On September 9th
the -defendant appeared and asked to have
cause continued. The cause was continued
to 6 P. M. September 11th. At the stated
time the defendant not being present, the
justice heard the evidence of the plaintiff,
and entered judgment by default against
the defendant for $5.22.
September 12, 1899, C. M. Romberger,
the defendant, appeared after judgment
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was rendered, and made affidavit that he ment, his decision is final; and the judgwas under the impression that suit was to ment may be reviewed by a certiorari.
be at 8 P. M., instead of 6 P.M., and that Whitehead v. Gillespy, 1 Phila. 515 ; Cf.
he had a just defense and set-off to plain- Galley v. Davenport, 1 Ash. 149. Johnson
of the justice by
tiff's claim, and asked for a rule to show has arrested the action
record by the
his
him
from
withdrawing
cause why judgment should not be opened
it
premature.
think
We
certiorari.
notice
and
granted,
Rule
rehearing.
a
for
But, had the justice a right to open the
of same accepted by plaintiff's attorney.
of King,
Time fixed for argument on rule, Sept. 18, judgment? It was the opinion
ample a
as
almost
had
a
justice
that
J..
1899, at 8 P. Al. Upon hearing argument,
judgment opened for a rehearing, time for control over his judgments as the Common
not
rehearing fixed September 23, 1899. At- Pleas, and that he could open them
torney for the plaintiff objected to opening simply within the times or for the causes
of the judgment, and had a writ of certio- mentioned in the Act of March 20, 1810,
rari served upon justice to return record but beyond these times, and for other
and proceedings to Court of Common Pleas. causes. Galley v. Davenport, 1 Ash. 149
a
JOHNSON and RUSSELL for the plaintiiff (1828). This is, in our judgment, too lax
His
justice.
the
of
powers
the
of
view
only
hisjudgment
1. A justice can open
at the instance of the appellant, with the powers are statutory. The Act of 1810 has
consent of the adverse party. Act of March taken pains to state two sets of conditions
20, 1810 ; Stockdale v. Campbell, 1 Phila. under which he may open his judgments.
520 ; Long v. Caffrey, 8 Phila. 548.
The Act of July 12, 1842, has also conferred
CLIPPINGER and DEAL for the defendthis power under special circumstances.
ant.
correction of errors in procedure or on
The
may
justice
defendant
of
1. On appeal
open judgment by default within thirty the merits is made possible by certiorari
days, when defendant was absent at time or appeal. We cannot persuade ourselves
of judgment through unavoidable cause. that the justice may open judgments, exLarue v. Haggerty, 5 Phila. 530.
cept when the -facts exist which are made
OPINION OF THE COURT.
by the Acts of Assembly a cause therefor.
This is a certiorarito the justice to bring Thus, the fourth section of the Act of 1810,
up the proceedings against Romberger in authorizing an opening within twenty
favor of Johnson. It is a deeply-rooted days, the justice has no right to open for
principle that appellate proceedings are the cause mentioned therein beyond that
not to be begun until there is a final judg- period; Nippes v. Kirk, 8 Phila. 299;
ment, and prior to the Act of May 20, 1891,
Gregg v. Ashenfelder, 5 Phila. 468; Rus1 P. & L. 135, the opening of a judgment sell v. Smith, 1 Phila. 425; and the sevwas not reviewable in the Supreme Court. enth section, authorizing the justice to
When the judgment is finally entered, it open a judgment within thirty days, he
may appear that the party has suffered cannot open, for the causes mentioned
nothing, because it is the same or even a
therein, when the thirty days have elapsed.
more favorable one than that originally
Long v. Caffrey, 8 Phila. 547; Nippes v.
a
to
favorable
less
be
entered. Should it
Kirk.
party, he could then appeal from it, or
The thirty-first section of the Act of July
Stev
Stockdale
review it on certiorari.
1842, 1 P. & L. 2580, provides for the
12,
phen, 1 Phila. 520; Nippes v. Kirk, 8
of a judgment, where the attach.
opening
granted
justice
the
case
one
In
299.
Phila.
summons shall not have been
or
ment
a rule to open thejudgment, but the parties
against
not appearing on the day named in the personally served. The proceeding
the
and
attachment,
an
is
not
Romberger
rule, entered on his docket: "Judgment
on himis hereby postponed indefinitely, or until summons was personally served
not open Johnson's judgthe parties fix the time." The Common The justice could
of this act. Whitehead v.
Pleas entertained a certiorari,because the ment in virtue
1 Phila. 515.
effect of the justice's act was to finally de- Gillespy,
The fourth section of the Act of March
prive the plaintiff of the benefit of his
judgment. Long v. Caffrey, 8 Phila. 546. 20, 1810, 1 P. & L. 2601, declares that it
of thejustice, with
When the justice refuses to open the judg- shall be "in the power
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consent of the parties, or their agents, to
open his judgment and give them another
hearing," at the instance of the appellant;
that is, of the party who, within twenty
days, signifies to the justice his purpose to
appeal. Stockdale v. Campbell, 1 Phila.,
520. Romberger has, so far as appears, not
signified his intention to appeal, nor has
Johnson consented to the opening. The
opening was therefore not under this section.
The seventh section of the Act of March
20, 1810, 1 P. & L. 2.569, provides that "in
case ofjudgment by default, the defendant,
if he has any account to set off against the
plaintiff's demand, shall be entitled to a
rehearing before the justice within thirty
days, on proof being made * * * * that
the defendant was absent when the process
was served, and did not return home before
the return day of such process, or that he
was prevented by sickness of himself, or
other unavoidable cause." The conditions
under which, under this clause, the justice
may open a judgment, are (1) that it be by
default; (2) thatthe non-appearance at the
trial is shown to have been unavoidable;
(3) that the defendant has a set-off; and
(4) that the rehearing takes place within
thirty days.
Was the Johnson judgment by default?
The sixth section directs "the justice to
enter a judgment by default, in case the
defendant does not appear upon summons,
on the day appointed." Even when he
does not appear, the justice cannot give
judgment for the plaintiff without hearing
evidence (See I P. & L. 2563, and cases
there cited). Romberger did appear on the
day appointed; but by agreement, the
hearing was continued till the second following day, at 6 P. M. On that time he
did not appear. The justice heard Johnson's evidence, and gave judgment for
him. This, we think, is, in the statutory
sense, a judgment by default. A justice's
judgment by default is not a judgment
entered, merely because the defendant does
not appear or plead, but a judgment entered, after evidence of plaintiff, and without evidence of the defendant, who is not
present.
The cause for opening must be made to
appear, on oath of the defendant or otherwise. The defendant, Romberger, ,made

the oath. The non-appearance of the defendant at the hearing must be shown to
have been because of his sickness, "6r
other unavoidable cause." A misapprehension of.the hour might be an unavoidable cause.
The Act of April 15, 1845, 1 P. & L. 1946,
declares that "the wages of any laborers
* * shall not be liable to attachment in
the hands of the employer." The policy of
this Act is to prevent the interception of
the wages before they reach the employ6,
by any creditor, including the employer.
Leonard v. Peirce, 1 Forum 79. As the
object of opening a judgment, under the
seventh section of the Act of 1810, is to setoffia claim, and as the judgment was for
wages, and we are of opinion that the setoff cannot be allowed, it was error for the
justice to open the judgment.
As, however, the certiorarihas been sued
out prematurely, it is quashed.
SAMUEL OTT vs. NILES SPERRY.
Escrow.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Charles Ott, intending to convey as a
gift a house and lot to his nephew, Sperry,
prepared a deed, signed and sealed it, and
put it in the hands of a friend, William
Frame, instructing him to keep it for
Sperry until he reached the age of twentyfive years, then to hand it to him, and
meantime to let Sperry know nothing of
the transaction. Frame observed the direction, and, when Sperry became twentyfive years old, informed him of the act of
Ott, but did not deliver the deed, because,
a year before, Ott had withdrawn it from
his possession, and destroyed it. Sperry,
nevertheless, tookpossession, and, Ott then
dying, his only child, Samuel, brings this
ejectment.
SEBRING and MITCHELL for the plaintiff.
1. The deed from Charles Ott was not
an escrow, for it lacked two essentials of
an escrow: agreement between grantor
and grantee, and a valuable consideration.
Scott v. Laumans, 104 Pa. 593; Am. &
Eng. Encyc. of Law (2nd Ed.), Vol. II, p.
335.
2. This being a voluntary conveyance,
and the gift incomplete, the grantor has
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power to revoke any time before the grantee
reached the age of twenty-five years. Hoig
v. Adrian College, 83 Ill. 267 ; Stephens v.
Rinehart, 72 Pa. 434; Fritz v. Brustle, 41
L. 1. 4; Thompson's Ex. v. Lloyd, 49 Pa.
128.
TAYLOR and McDONALD for defendant.
1. This isa delivery of a deed in escrow,
and cannot be revoked. Foster's Estate,
4 W. N. C. 128 ;Baum's Appeal, 113 Pa.
58 ; Tiedeman on Real Property, 799.
2. A good consideration is sufficient.
Lewis v. Brewster, 57 Pa. 410; Am. &
Eng. Encyc., Vol. 8, p. 1331.
CHARGE OF COURT.

A deed may be delivered to one man in
order that, at some future time, he may in
turn deliver it to the grantee named in it.
The event on which the second delivery is
to take place may be some act of the
grantee, e.g., his paying money to or for
the grantor-Baum's Appeal, 113 Pa. 58;
Landon v. Brown, 160 Pa. 538; Blight v.
Schenck, 10 Pa. 285; or it may be an event
over which the grantee has no control, e.
g., the death of the grantor. Stephens v.
Rinehart, 72 Pa. 434 ; Levengood v. Bailey,
1 Woodw. 275. In the former case, the
grantee will have no right to the deed, nor
to the estate Conveyed by it, unless he performs the condition. 160 Pa. 538. In the
latter, he will gain the right to both, on
the occurrence of the event. Thus, if A
makes a deed to his wife-1 Woodw. 275,
or his grandchildren-72 Pa. 434; Ste.
phens v. Huss, 54 Pa. 20, and deposits it
with X, to be delivered by X, after his
death, to the grantees, and if, on the
grantor's death, X does deliver it to the
grantees, these have a good title to the
land. X is not such an agent as that his
power to deliver is revoked by the very
event, viz: the grantor's death, upon which
he is tQ deliver. Of. Hatch v. Hatch, 2
Mass. 307; Foster v. Mansfield, 3 Metc.
412; Lloyd v. Bennet, 8 C. & P. 124.
The deed to Sperry by Ot was similar to
the deeds in Stephens v. Rinehart and
Levengood v. Bailey. It was, like them,
apparently prompted by natural affection.
Itwas, like them, gratuitous. HadFrame
retained the deed until Ott's death, and
then delivered it, the grantees would have
become vested with an ownership that
would prevail against the pretensions of
heirs. But, Frame did not retain nor de-

liver the deed. It was recalled by Ott a
year before his death. What is the effect
of this recall?
When a deed has been delivered to the
grantee, the fact that it finds its way back
to the possession of the grantor has no
effect upon the title of the grantee. That
passed to him when the deed was delivered. It does not pass back if the grantor,
with or without his consent, regains the
custody of it. Turner v. Warren, 160 Pa.
336; Wymarkes' Case, 5 Coke 75; Souverbye v. Arden, 1 Johns. Ch. 240; Blight v.
Schenck, 10 Pa. 285. It would follow that
if the putting of the deed into the hands
of Frame was a delivery, the subsequent
act of Ott could not make it something
else.
A delivery does not presuppose that the
deed reaches the grantee. When the last
act of control, intended by the grantor,
has been exerted upon the deed, and he
intends, thenceforth, that he shall have no
power over it, the deed is delivered even
though it remain with the grantor. Scrugham v. Wood, 1.5 Wend. 575; Began v.
Howe, 121 Mass. 424; Trickett, Assignments, 31; McKinney v. Rhoads, 5 W.
343. Ott's deed was handed to Frame, not
to keep for Ott, or subject to his direction,
but to "keep itfor Sperry until he reached
the age of twenty-five years." The last
act Ott intended to exert on the deed was
done. Thenceforth, his purpose was that
it should abide with Frame for Sperry.
Had Sperry made a contract with Ott to
pay a sum of money at a future time, and
to receive the deed from Frame on such
payment, Ott could not have effectively
revoked the deed. It would have operated,
on the payment of the money, although
not delivered by Frame-Shirley v. Ayres,
14 Ohio 307; Couch v. Meeker, 2 Conn.
302; 11 Am. & Eng. Encyc. 345, or the
court would compel Frame or Ott to deliver the deed to Sperry. Stanton v.
Miller, 58 N. Y. 202; Baum's Appeal, 113
Pa. 58. But on what theory would the
deed operate without second delivery, but
that the delivery to Frame was, on the
happening of the conditioning event, to
be considered as a delivery to Sperry?
"Where," says Sharswood, J., quoting
Shaw, C. J., "it [i. e., the second delivery]
is merely to await the lapse of time, or the
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happening of some contingency, and not
the performance of any condition, it will
be deemed the grantor's deed presently."
Stephens v. Rinehart, 72 Pa. 434 ; Landon
v. Brown, 160 Pa. 538. The use of an intermediary is simply a device for vesting
the estate subject to a defeasance on failure
of the stipulated event.
The deed to Sperry was gratuitous. It
was also unknown to Sperry. A gratuitous deed, once delivered, is no more revokable than one for a consideration. An
unexecuted intention to give may be abandoned, but a gift actually made is beyond
repentance. A conveyance, as a gift, is
made by the same acts as those by which
any other conveyance is made. A deed,
executed and delivered, effects both. Delivery does not have one sense when there
is a consideration, and another when the
conveyance is a gift. If the deposit of the
deed with Frame, for a purchaser for value,
would have been a delivery, the same deposit for a beneficiary would be a delivery.
In both cases the exercise of what is intended to be the last act of control marks
the moment of the delivery.
Ott changed his mind, and obtained the
deed from Frame. But, if the deed had
been delivered, he had no power effectively
to change his mind. A consummated
gift, of chattels or of land, cannot be revoked. The gift to Sperry was consummated, if Ott, in giving the deed to Frame,
intended to part with all control over it.
That such was his intention is quite clear.
The conclusion we have reached does not
accord with what seems to have been the
opinion ofGilmore, P.J., who, in Stephens
v. Huss, 54 Pa. 20, told the jury that if the
grantor recalled the deed from the depository, the authority of the latter would
be revoked, and a subsequent delivery of
the deed would be void. As the jury
found that there had been no revocation,
the Supreme Court had no occasion to consider the question.
Sperry did not know of the deed, and
could not therefore expressly assent to it.
He assented as soon as he knew of it.
When a deed is put, in the intention of
the grantor, out of his control, we think
the express dissent of the grantee is necessary to prevent the passage of the ownership to latter. The deed is an offer under

seal, which cannot be recalled, until rejected. Clark, Cont. 47.
It follows, therefore, gentlemen of the
jury, that if you find the narrative of the
facts by the-witness, Frame, to be correct,
your verdict should be for the defendant.
ESTATE OF JENNIE SMITH, DEC'D.
Decedents' estates-Powerofsale-Seewit.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

On the 21st day of April, A. D. 1890,
Jennie Smith made her last will and testament, which was afterwards, to wit: on
the 1st day of September, 1899, duly probated. Mrs. Smith died on the 25th day
of August, 1899. She directed among other
things, "Thirdly-All the rest, residue
and remainder of my estate, real, personal
and mixed, whatsoever and wheresoever,
I give and bequeath unto my sister, Emma
Blair, to have and to hold the said remainder of my property for and during the
term of her natural life. And at the death
of my sister, Emma Blair, all the property
hereby devised or bequeathed to her, as
aforesaid, or so much as may remain unexpended, I give and bequeath unto my
two sisters, Lizzie Smith and Dellah Wert,
share and share alike, their heirs and assigns, forever."
The executor was given general power
to sell this land and convert it into personalty, and pay all the debts.
The estate will amount to about $5,000,
but there is an indebtedness of $4,000,
leaving a balance of about$1,000 for Emma
Blair.
In distribution proceedings, Emma Blair
asks that the $1,000 be paid to her without
security.
SHiPmAN and WINLACK for the plain-

tiff.
Devisee is entitled to balance without
securing remaindermen. Taylor v. Bell,
158 Pa. 651 ; Hambright's Appeal, 2 Grant
320; Markley's Estate, 132 Pa. 352;
Green's Appeal, 42 Pa. 25. An actual sale
under a naked power of sale works a conversion. Lackey's Estate, 1.49 Pa. 7
Maury's Estate, 167 Pa. 549.
SHREvE and ROBITAILLE for the defend-

ant.
Executor cannot pay over the money
without an order from the Court, or giving.
a refunding bond. 32Pa. 297; 101-Pa. 278.
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OPItNION OF THE COURT.

The gift to Emma Blair is expressly "for
and during the term of her natural life,"
both of realty and personalty. The testatrix, however, attempts to say what shall
become of it at Emma's death. She says,
"IAnd at the death of my sister, Emma
Blair, all the property hereby devised or
bequeathed to her, as aforesaid, orso much
as remains unexpended, I give and bequeath to" L. S. and D. W., their heirs
and assigns, forever. The words, "or so
much s. remains unexpended," plainly
contemnplate that Emma Blair may, at her
death, have expended some of the property
bequeathed to her, and bequeaths over only
what shall then be unexpended. As a will
consists in the dispositive intention of
the testator, it matters not whether such
intention be directly enpressed or implied.
In Hambright's Appeal, 2 Gr. 320, the gift
was of $3,000 to A. "for her full use during
her lifetime." The bequest over was, "at
her death, if any left," to S.'s heirs. The
inference drawn by the Court was that A.
had the right to expend as much as she
would. Cf. also Fox's Appeal, 99 Pa. 882;
Follweiler's Appeal, 102 Pa. 581 ; Jauretche
v. Proctor, 48 Pa. 471; Markley'sEst., 132
Pa. 352; Hippenstall's Est., 144 Pa. 259;
Gold's Est., 133 Pa. 495.
There is greater reluctance, however, to
draw this inference with respect to land
than to personalty. Though a gift for life
of real and personal property is made by
one phrase in the will, and it is followed
by a gift over of the part unexpended, or
the residue, the implication of a right in
the primary donee to expend is confined
in several cases to the personalty. The
interest in theland has not been permitted
by inference to be enlarged into more than
a life estate. Taylor v. Bell, 158 Pa. 651 ;
Follweiler's Appeal, 102 Pa. 581. In Cox
v. Sims, 125 Pa. 522. the testator gave
the "rest, residue and remainder of my
[his] estate, real, personal and mixed," to
his wife, "for and during the whole period
of her natural life, and from and immediately after the death of my [his] said
wife all the property hereby devised to her,
as aforesaid, or so much thereof as may remain unexpended, I give," etc. The
widow attempted to "expend" a tract of
land by selling it in fee simple. The Su-

preme Court held that she could convey
only a life estate.
The Jennie Smith will gives the executor
power to sell the land and convert it into
cash. The power to sell it does not convert it. It was devised as land to Emma
Blair. When the executor sold it, he sold
land in which Emma Blair had a life
estate. The sale cannot well be conceived
to change the magnitude of her interest
so as to give her a power of expending the
money, when she was destitute of the
power of expending the land. Had the
will directed the executor to sell, Emma
Blair would have taken the proceeds as
personalty. The land, as such, passed to
her for life. The subsequent conversion of
it did not enlarge her estate in it, or the
money which represented it. It is well
settled that when land is sold under a
power (as distinguished from a power and
a command to sell), the proceeds will belong to those to whom the land belonged,
and that they will take analogous estates
therein. Machemer's Estate, 140 Pa. 544;
Pyott's Est., 160 Pa. 441 ; Mellon v. Reed,
123 Pa. 1; Darlington v. Darlington: 160
Pa. 65.
It may be that the will of Jennie Smith
clearly indicates her intention that her
executor should sell the land. The indebtedness is $4,000. The personalty may
have been very small in amount. A sale
of the land for the discharge of debts may
have been to the testatrix manifestly necessary, and she may have intended to confer
no option on the executor. But the language of the will is not given. We are
told simply that it gave a "general power"
to sell and pay debts. The case stated does
not inform us whether the personalty was
more or less than enough to pay the debts.
It is impossible, therefore, to say that the
land was converted into money by the will
alone.
Had the will converted the land Into
money, the widow, having the right to
consume as much of it as she chose, would
be entitled to its possession without giving security. Hambright's Appeal, 2 Gr.
320; Heppenstall's Est., 144 Pa. 259. When
the remainderman's right depends on the
discretion of the preceding taker, he may
not condition the latter's custody of the
fund upon the giving of a bond.
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The 49, Act February 24, 1834; 1 P. &
L. 1509; the Act of April 17, 1869; 1 P. &
L. 1510; and the Act of May 17, 1871; 1
P. & L. 1511, apply only to bequests of personal estate; and do not therefore in terms
touch the present case. Though doubt
was expressed in Lippencott v. Warder,
14 S. &R. 115; and King v. Diehl, 9 S. &
R. 409, 423, as to the power of the Orphans'
Court, in the absence of legislation, to require a life-owner of a fund to give security
for its proper transmission at his deathHolman's Appeal, 24 Pa. 174, we do not
doubt that in accordance with the policy
of the statute, the Court may and should
require security. A payment by the executor to Emma Blair, under an order of the
Court, would protect the former-Gormley's Est., 154 Pa. 378 ; Stewart's Appeal,
86 Pa. 149 ; Charlton's Appeal, 88 Pa. 476 ;
but we do not think that the interests of
Lizzie Smith and Della Wert should be
put at hazard. An order' will therefore be
entered that the executor retain and invest
the money, unless Emma Blair furnish
security for its forthcoming at her death.

Miles 309; Burd v. Burd, 40 Pa. 182; Maxwell v. McClintock, 10 Pa. 237.
2. The personal representatives of a
deceased postponed legatee are entitled to
payment, and the legacy does not revert
to the residuary legatee. Act of March19,
1810 ; Muller's Estate, 19 W. N. C. 320;
Stone v. Massey, 2 Yeates, 369.
RALS ToN and EDWARDS for the defend-

ant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

1. Upon the death of a legatee before
the time of payment of a legacy charged
upon land, the legacy sinks back into the
land. Stone v. Massey, 2 Yeates, 369;
Hawkinson Wills, p. 46, Note 2 ; Massey's
Appeal, 88 Pa. 470.
2. Legacies charged on land do not vest
before the time of payment, unless an intention to the contrary appears. Hawkins
on Wills, 234, 235.
The general rule was established by a
number of early English cases, that when
a legacy, payable infuturo, is charged upon
personal estate, the personal estate is not
relieved by the death of the legatee before
the time of payment arrives; but that
when such a legacy is charged upon real
estate, the death of the legatee before the
time of payment causes the legacy to lapse
and sink into the inheritance. Poulet v.
GORDON'S ESTATE vs. McQUADE.
Poulet, 1 Vern. 204; Jennings v. Looks, 2
P. Williams, 276; Duke of Chandos, v.
Postponed legacycharged on land-Rights
Talbot, 2 P. Williams, 601; Remnant v.
of administratorof deceased legatee.
Hood, 2 DeG., F. & J. 3896; Hawkins
"ia Wills (2nd ed.), p. 234; Jarman on
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Wills, Vol. 1, p. 628 ; Am. & Eng. Encyc.
The following are the words of a will:
of Law, Vol. 29, p. 463. The rule was
"I devise and bequeath to my said wife,
adopted, says Chancellor Walworth, "for
Catharine, all my real estate, to manage
the benefit of the heir at law, who was a
and use the same as she may think best
particular favorite of the English courts."
for and during the term of her natural life.
Birdsall v. Hewlett, 1 Paige's Ch. (N. Y.)
After the death of my said wife, I devise
32. "It rests," says Mr. Chief Justice
and bequeath to my son, Frank, my home
Durfee, of Rhode Island, "rather upon the
farm, whereon I now live, containing 2221
English prejudice in favor of the heir, or
acres, more or less, upon the condition that
the devisee, who is, it is said, factus
he shall pay to my youngest daughter,
haeres, than upon any sound principle."
Letitia, the sum of $100, which I make a
The English courts, however, have always
charge on said land to him and his heirs
confined the application of the rule to cases
and assigns forever."
where the payment is postponed for the
Letitia died before the wife, Catharine,
benefit of the legatee, or for reasons.perbut leaving a husband and three children.
sonal to him, and not for the benefit of the
fs Frank bound to pay the $100 to Letitia,
estate. Hawkins on Wills (supra), and
or did the legacy lapse on her death?
cases already cited. And the courts of this
YEAGER and SAULSBURY for the plaincountry, while reluctantly following the
tiff.
general rule established in England, have
1. A legacy is vested upon the death of
the testator, even though, for the con- been eager to so construe cases as to carry
them beyond its bounds. Thus, in Birdvenience of the estate, its payment is indefinitely postponed. Tatem v. Tatem, 1
sall v. Hewlett (supra), where the testatol
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devised certain real estate to his widow for
life, or during her widowhood, and, after
her death or marriage, devised the same
to his nephew in fee, provided he paid the
legacies mentioned inthe will, and directed
that such legacies should be paid by the
nephew whenever he should come into
possession of the premises devised, it was
held that the estate being given upon the
express condition of the payment of the
legacies, and the time of payment being
postponed for the benefit of the estate, and
not with reference to any particular circumstances in relation to the legatees,
which might render it doubtful whether
the legacy would ever be wanted, the
legacy became vested at the same time
that the estate in remainder vested in the
devisee, that is, at the death of the testator.
In Pond v. Allen, 15 R. I. 171, where
the testatrix gave all of her estate to her
husband for life, and directed that one year
after her death a number of legacies should
be paid, it was held that the payment of
such legacies constituted a charge on the
land, that since the payment of the legacies was postponed for the benefit of the
husband, and not for reasons personal to
the legatees, the legacies vested upon the
death of the testatrix, and that the personal representatives of the legatees,
who died before time of payment, were
entitled to receive payment from the devisee of the estate.
Turning to our own State, we find in
Maxwell v. McClintock, 10 Pa. St. 237, a
case very similar to the one before us.
There, the testator devised land to his wife
for life, and at her death to his daughter
in fee, subject, nevertheless, to the payment of $600 to his grandson and a small
legacy to his sister, "which two legacies I
direct to be paid by my daughter, Martha,
in one year after the decease ofher mother."
The court declared that the legacy of $600
to the grandson vested concurrently with
the remainder in fee. "That payment was
postponed," says Mr. ChiefJustice Gibson,
"for the benefit of the widow, and not for
the capacity or age of the grandson, is
evident from the nature of the case. She
was to have the benefit of the whole of the
estate, and not the estate less $600 taken
out of it, for the property, thus crippled,
might have been inadequate to her main-
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tenance. Again, she was not only to have
the whole, but to enjoy it without disturbance. * * * * The time of payment
was consequently postponed for her protection, and not for the protection of the
legatee." This reasoning may be applied
with equal force to the facts of the case at
bar. The payment of the legacy of $100
does not appear to have been postponed on
account of her lack of years, or for any
other reason personal to her, but in order
that the wife of the testator imight enjoy
her life estate without diminution or disturbance. It follows that the legacy to
Letitia vested concurrently with the devise
to Frank, and that by the death of Letitia the charge did not sinik into the land,
but survived for the benefit of her estate.
The decree of the Orphans' Court, directing a sale of the land for the payment of
the legacy, is affirmed.

CHAS. MANN VS. THOMPSON & CO.
Agent- Unauthorized Acts-Liability of
Principal.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Thomas Sanger, a traveling salesman,
representing Thompson & Co., of Philadelphia, wholesale grain jobbers, sold to
Charles Mann, of York, Pa., "2 cars of
corn," aggregating about 1000 bushels, on
the first of April, 1899, at 50 cents per
bushel, and gave Mann a copy of the
order slip, signed "Sanger, Agt."
Mann not hearing from the house wrote
to them April 3rd, asking why they did
They replied that
not ship the corn.
the order had not been received. Mann
wrote to Sanger, then at Carlisle, telling
him what the house had said. Sanger
replied from Carlisle that he had phoned
the order in promptly to the head of the
firm, but would give it his personal
attention when he got to Philadelphia.
Several letters were exchanged and on
April 10th the firm wrote to Mann that
since his iating was not satisfactory they
would not ship the corn. Mann wrote
that he had purchased the goods subject
to "sight draft upon arrival of cars" and
asked for no credit whatever,
On the 15th of April the firm wrote to
Mann coutending that Sanger was not
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their agent, but simply sent them orders
that he took, as he also did to several
other jobbers, and flatly repudiated the
contract.
Sanger had sold to various retailers in
York prior to this time as Thompson &
Co.'s agent, of which Mann was cognizant,
but he had never sold to Mann before.
By the 15th of April the price of corn had
advanced 25 cents per bushel and Mann
was compelled to purchase elsewhere at
this higher figure to supply his trade.
Mann now brings this suit against
Thompson & Co. to recover the damages
or loss he sustained by their breach of the
contract. Defendant moves for a compulsory non-suit.
SLoAx and ROTHERMEL for the plaintiff.
1. The case should go to the jury for
previous sales are evidence of Sanger's
agency, for agency is implied where one
party accepts the benefits resulting from
the transactions of another party ostensibly acting as his agent. Hagerstown
Bank vs. Loudon Society, 3 Grant 136;
Emerson vs. Miller, 27 Pa. 276.
BowEns and PIPER for the defendant.
1. There is no evidence of Sanger's
agency and the plaintiff must be nonsuited
for (a) Agency can neither be created nor
proved by the declarations of the pretending agent. Rose vs. Walker, 2 Forum 42;
Whiting & Co. vs. Lake, 91 Pa. 249;
Clark vs. Baker, 2 Whart. 340. (b) It is
not offered to prove any acts of the principal that would be evidence of their recognition of Sanger.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The motion of the defendant for a compulsory non-suit must be granted. A careful study of the facts in the record convinces us that there is not sufficient
evidence to submit to a jury, either of a
prior authorization of Sanger to make the
sale to plaintiff, or of a subsequent ratification thereof. Sanger was a traveling
salesman representing the defendants, and
as such had authority to solicit and receive orders on their behalf. In makinga
sale, however, he unquestionably stepped
beyond the bounds of his authority. McKindley v. Dunham, 55 Wis., 515; Clough
v. Whitcomb, 105 Mass., 482; Am. and
Encyc. of Law (2nd ed.) vol. 6, p. 224.
The plaintiff was bound to ascertain
Sanger's real powers and was not justified
in relying merely upon his own statements that he was not exceeding his

authority. Whiting v. Lake, 91 Pa., 349;
Central Pa. Tel. Co. v. Thompson, 112 Pa.,
118; Korneman v. Monaghan, 24 Mich.,
36; Edwards v. Dooley, 120 N. Y., 540. It
is contended,. however, that the defendants are estopped to deny Sanger's authority to sell, because he had previously sold
to various retailers in York as their agent.
But we have no evidence that defendants
knew of such sales. So far as we know
the orders sent to defendants contained no
notice that Sanger had pretended to make
sales, instead of merely taking orders subject to their approval and acceptance.
And even conceding that they were aware
of his attempt to make sales, we have no
evidence that they delivered the grain or
in any other way recognized the contracts
as binding upon them. It may be that
the previous sales were positively repudiated by defendants. Certainly the single
fact that Sanger had on previous occasions
pretended to make contracts on behalf of
defendants, unsupported by any other
evidence, does not estop them from denying his authority.
The conduct of the defendants after receiving the order of plaintiff is likewise,
so far as we can judge, above criticism.
There is not the slightest evidence that
they were aware that Sanger had pretended to make a sale until plaintiff wrote
them that "he had purchased the goods
subject to sight draft upon arrival of cars,"
&c. It is true that Sanger wrote to plaintiff that he had "phoned the order in"
promptly. But there is no evidence that
he actually did phone the order in
promptly. And even if he did, we cannot
assume that he informed defendants that
he had not merely taken an order, but had
made a sale. It is true that Sanger wrote
plaintiff that he would give the matter
his personal attention when he reached
Philadelphia. But there is no evidence
that he did so. It is true that several
letters were exchanged between plaintiff
and defendants, but we are not informed
of the contents of any except that of the
tenth, and there is nothing in that which
evidences knowledge on the part of defendants that the transaction between
Sanger and plaintiff amounted to more
than the taking of an order subject to their
approval. Indeed, the fact that defend-
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ants in that letter declined to fill the order,
is persuasive to the view that at that time
Thompson & Co. had no knowledge that
any actual sale had been attempted.
Assuming then, as we must, that defendants had no knowledge that a con
tract of sale had been made until they received plaintiff's letter in reply to their's
of the 10th, which letter probably reached
them about the 12th or 13th, it appears
that defendants, within three days at the
most, wrote to plaintiff disavowing
Sanger's authority to make the contract.
It would be difficult indeed to find in such
prompt action any evidence of ratification.
The motion for a compulsory non-suit is
granted.

OPINION OF THE COURT.

Cooper delivered to the Cumberland Valley Railroad Company a carriage, consigned to John Twaylor. Notwithstanding
he mistakenly interpreted the order of his
agent, Holmes, it -wasto Twaylor, and not
Taylor, that he intended, to sell the carriage, and it was the duty of the defendant
Railroad Company to deliver it to the consignee, and no other. It had no volition
in the matter. The delivery to another
was a conversion. No sale to Taylor was
ever assented to by Cooper. Shenk v.
Propeller Co., 60 Pa. 109; Wenwag & Dawson v. R. R., 117 Pa. 46; R. R. v. Stern,
119 Pa. 24; Price v. R. R., 50 N. Y. 213.
The contention that the plaintiff might
have received the price of the carriage from
COOPER vs. IAILROAD CO.
Taylor, who "was able and willing to-pay
for the Same," will not discharge the deCommon carriers--1isdelierny--Damages. fendant from its liability, or mitigate the
damages which he is entitled to recover.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
There was a breach of duty. It is not a
Holmes, for Cooper, doing business in sufficient excuse to show that the plaintiff
Mechanicsburg, solicited and obtained an could have sold to another person, and that
order for a carriage from one John Taylor, this person was willing and able to pay.
in Chambersburg. In Chambersburg there The only reply to plaintiff's action which
lived, atthp same time, one John Twaylor. the law will recognize is, that the property
Cooper, knowing of the latter, but not of was delivered to the consignee.
the former, supposed that Holmes had
In Ludwig v. Meyers, 5 W. & S. 435, the
mistakenly written in the order Taylor for property, although not delivered to the
Twaylor, and sent the carriage by the C. consignee, yet was delivered to a creditor
V. R. R., consigned to John Twaylor. of the consignor, who credited him with it
When it arrived Taylor inquired for it, on his indebtedness, yet the Court held
and the company, learning that he had that the carrier was not excused for the
directe4 Holmes to order it, inferred that wrong delivery, and a recovery was had
Twaylor was intended to be Taylor, and for the full value of the consignment.
delivered the carriage. Though Taylor
The decision in Patterson v. Moore's
was able and willing to pay for the car- Ex., 34 Pa. 69, was based on the same prinriage, Cooper sues the R. R. Co. for a mis- ciple.
delivery, claiming as damages the value of
The case of Adams Express Company v.
the carriage. The price of the carriage Egbert, 36 Pa. 360, relied upon by the dewas $250.
fendants, is not in conflict with the conAUBREY and ALEXANDER for the plain- clusion we have reached. There theplans
tiff.
had no value unless accepted, and the con1. A common carrier, in case of misdelivery, is liable to the consignor, the tract to deliver did not furnish any guide
measure of damages being the full value of for the measurement of damages. Here
the goods. Wernwag v. R. R. Co., 117 the price of the carriage was fixed, and
Pa. 46; Patterson v. Moore, 34 Pa. 69; Lud- that it was of that value is not disputed,
wig v. Meyers, 5 W. & S. 435.
but conceded.
FENTON and LENTZ for the defendant.
The plaintiff is therefore entitled to re1. This is a technical conversion, from cover from the defendant $250 as damages.
which the plaintiff has suffered no damage, unless voluntarily. We contend for and judgment will be entered accordingly.
nominal damages. Moore v. Patterson, 10
By the Court.
Casey 69; Forsythe v. Walker, 9 Pa. 148;
Egbert v. Adams Express Co., 36 Pa. 360.

THE FORUM.
JOHN JAMISON vs. DEPOSIT BANK.
Post dated Check-Bill of ExchangeCertification.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Ira Caldwell had a deposit in the bank,
and on August 2d, 1897, drew a check
thereon for $299, in favor of Jamison, payable four days after date. Jamison, before
accepting it, asked the cashier whether
the check was good, and was told yes. He
then accepted it. Six days after he presented it for payment to the bank, but
was told that Caldwell had, the day before,
withdrawn his deposit, and payment was
refused.
BOLTE and JOHN for the defendant.
1. An order drawn either on a corporation or individual, payable a certain
number of days after date or sight is a bill
of exchange and not a check. Bull vs.
Bank of Kasson, 123 U. S. 110. Champion
vs. Gordon, 70 Pa. 474. Lawson vs.
Richards, 6 Phila. 179.
2. No person within this state shall be
charged as an acceptor on a bill of exor order drawn for the paychange,
ment of draft
money exceeding $20, unless his
acceptance shall be in writing signed by
himself or his lawful agent. Act of May
10, 1881, P. L. 17. P. &. L. Dig. page 346.
FRANTZ and HARTMAN for the plaintiff.

1. The cashier's representation is in
effect a certification, and this is equivalent
to an acceptance by the bank of a bill for
the amount of the check. Pope vs. Bank,
59 Barb. 226; Marine Bank vs. City Bank,
59 N. Y. 67; Barnes vs. Ontario Bank, 19
N. Y. 159.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The defendant is a corporation. It is
responsible for the acts of its cashier when
acting within the scope of his authority.
That the cashier may bind a Bank by
certifying checks drawn upon it by marking them "goodwhen properly endorsed,"
or using words of like import is no longer
questioned. And it has been held that
this acceptance may be written or verbal.
Pope vs. Bank, 59 Barb. 226; Marine Bank
vs. City Bank, 59 N. Y. 67.
But the check must be a commercial
check. Checks are regarded as drawn
and dated the day they bear date. The
one in the case at bar was not such.
It was payable four days after. While
Jamison was informed by the cashier that

it was good, yet the latter had not authority to certify a post dated check, if the
instrument can be properly designated as
a check.
It was held in Clarke Nat. Bank vs.
Bank of Albion, 52 Barb. 592, that when a
cashier certifies a post dated check -6y an
endorsement dated on a day prior to the
date of the check, that the bank was not
bound thereby, for the reason that the
holder is notified by the discrepancy in the
dates on the paper itself that the cashier
had exceeded his authority. This ruling
has been recognized and approved in subsequent decisions and by Thompson on
Corporations, sec. 4818.
The declaration of the cashier in the
present case was before the check became
payable and was made to Jamison, the
plaintiff, and therefore not binding on the
Bank as between it and him. The form
of the check was ample to put him on,
inquiry as to the authority of the cashier
as in Dorsey vs. Abrams, 85 Pa. 299.
If the paper is to be regarded in effect
a bill of exchange, then asit is for the sum
of two hundred and ninety-nine dollars,
there could be no recovery under the Act
of May 10, 1881, as there was no written
acceptance. We are, therefore, satisfied
that the plaintiff is not entitled to recover
from the defendant.
SAMUEL BICKEL vs. MARY FERGUSON.
Conditional contract for sale of realtyepudiation- Violation of conMYinorditions.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Amos Thompson, owner of a house and
lot in Carlisle, on Aug 6th, 1896, made a
contract in writing to convey it to Mary
Ferguson, a married woman, aged 19 years
and 6 months. Mary Ferguson was, by
the terms of the contract, to occupy it, to
pay the taxes on it and to pay yearly $100,
and at the end of 10 years the lot was to
be conveyed subject to a mortgage for
$1,000, the remainder of the purchase
money. It was stipulated that if Ferguson ceased to occupy the premises for one
year, or failed to pay the taxes at any time
assessed on them, for the space of one
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year, Thompson should have power to
convey the premises to another, as fully
as if the contract had not been made.
Ferguson took possession, paid $100 and
the taxes of the first year. Seven months
after taking possession, she left the premises with her husband, paid no more of
the purchase money or taxes.
Three
years after leaving she returned to it, but
two months after her return Thompson
conveyed it in fee to Bickel. Bickel
threatening suit, Ferguson tendered the
whdle of the unpaid purchase money and
interest and all the taxes, and demanded a
conveyance, and Bickel bringing this
ejectment, paid the money into court.
MuRat AND MEYER for the plaintiff.
1. Bickel, Thompson's grantee, has the
right to eject for (a) after minority unreasonable delay in ratifying the contract
presumes repudiation. Quinn vs. Stone,
31 Mo., 160; Wharton on Contracts, Vol.
1, p. 608. (b.) Ferguson repudiated the
contract after attaining her majority by
violating its conditions. Minock vs. Shortridge, 21 Mich. 304; Hayden vs. Inhabitants of Stoughton, 5 Pick, 528; Whitemarsh vs. Hall, 3 Denio 375.
STEwART and PRINCE for the defendant.
1. Ferguson is equitably in rightful possession for (a) The ratification was made
within a reasonable time after minority.
(b) Ferguson was not bound by the terms
of the contract before ratification.
CHARGE OF COURT.
The contract between Amos Thompson
and Mary Ferguson stipulated that the
latter was to pay the taxes on the land, to
pay yearly $100 for 10 years, and, at the
end of that time, the conveyance was to
be made, subject to a mortgage. It was
also agreed that if the latter should cease
to occupy the premises for one year, or
fail to pay taxes for one year, Thompson
might convey the premises to another, as
fully as if the contract had not been made.
Parties sui juris are competent to make
such a contract, and, if the occasion is
furnished by one of them, on which the
other is to have the right to repossess
himself of the premises, or to sell them to
another, the one in default cannot insist
that the other shall not exercise his contractual privilege.
One of the parties, however, Mary Ferguson, was a married woman when the
contract was made. Even before the act
of 1887 a married woman could buy land

and give a mortgage or a judgment valid
against the land for the purchase money.
Nor is it to be doubted that she could
have given any other remedy in rem to
her vendor. The right to repossess or to
resell the premises is such a remedy.
Emery v. DeGolier, 117 Pa. 153. But this
contract was made in 1896, when a married woman had as large a power to make
contracts of purchase as an unmarried
person.
Mary Ferguson was likewise a minor
when she made the contract. It follows
that Thompson could not have compelled
her to pay the taxes or the price, or to
have performed any of her agreements.
But, nothing is better settled than that
the minor, after reaching majority, can
asseft rights under the contract made
during minority, only on the condition
that he ratifies the contract. He cannot
mutilate the contract ratifying some of its
provisions and repudiating others. He
accepts all or rejects all. If, e. g., he has
bought land, giving a mortgage for the
purchase money, his insistence when
adult on his ownership of the land is a
ratification of the mortgage. Kennedy v.
Baker, 159 Pa. 146. He cannot maintain
that the conveyance was valid, but the
accompanying mortgage void.
Mary
Ferguson is now an adult, claiming the
land. But such claim is an adoption of
the contract, of its granting portion and
of its defeasance. The latter she cannot
discard, while appropriating the former.
Emery v. DeGolier, 117 Pa. 153.
The stipulation was that failure to pay
taxes, or to hold possession, for one year,
should entitle Thompson to sell the land
to another. Mary Ferguson left the
premises for three years, and two of these
years followed her attainment of majority.
Thompson, then, had a right to sel 1 the
premises toanother, exactly as if the contract had notbeen made. Ita scriptum est.
This grantee, Bickel, has the same right
to the land that he would have had, had
no contract ever been made with Mrs. Ferguson.
Thompson did not sell the land to Bickel
until Mrs. Ferguson had gone back upon
it. But she committed a trespass in going
back. She could not revive her extinct
estate by an unauthorized act. Her equity
had expired. There is no reason, therefore, why Bickel should not recover. Your
verdict, therefore, gentlemen of the jury,
should be for the plaintiff.

